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JURISDICTION AND THE NON-RESIDENT
MOTORIST
N determining the validity of a law or a judgment, the pres-
ence of jurisdiction is always an important requisite.
Jurisdiction, as the term is applied to the acts, laws, or judg-
ments of a state, is the power of the sovereign to command
persons and things. "The foundation of jurisdiction is physi-
cal power." 1 Without jurisdiction the law is a nullity and
the court's determination is coram non judice and void.2 In
the law of nations it is indisputable that any direct exertion
of authority by one sovereign over persons domiciled or prop-
erty situated elsewhere is an encroachment upon the inde-
pendence of the other sovereign. If one nation attempts to
give an extraterritorial operation to its laws or to enforce an
extraterritorial jurisdiction by its tribunals over persons
domiciled or property situated in another nation, it will be
treated as usurpation.
Although the source of these principles is international
law, they are equally applicable to the several states of the
Union. Many of the powers which originally belonged to the
sovereign states were delegated by the United States Consti-
tution to the newly created Federal Government. However,
the powers not granted were reserved to the states or the
people, and to that extent each state does possess and exer-
cise many powers of an independent state. Therefore, the
problem of jurisdiction is not primarily solved by reference
to the Constitution or Constitutional Law, but, rather, to the
Conflict of Laws. It is true that as an incident thereto con-
stitutional questions will arise. For example, a natural con-
comitant of an attempt by a state to enforce a judgment over
persons or things where jurisdiction is wanting, is depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
But whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment has been vio-
lated depends on the presence or absence of jurisdiction. This
can only be ascertained by reference to the Conflict of Laws.
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343 (1917).
- Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); SToRY, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (3d
ed. 1846) 539.
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Story recognized the great importance of the question of
jurisdiction and its essentiality when he wrote as follows:
"The jurisdiction, then, arising from the conflict of the
laws of different nations, in their application to mod-
ern commerce and intercourse, is a most interesting
and important branch of public law. To no part of
the world is it of more interest and importance, than
to the United States, since the union of a national gov-
ernment with already that of twenty-six states, and in
some respects independent states, necessarily creates
very complicated private relations and rights between
the citizens of these states, which call for the constant
administration of extra-municipal principles." 3
Probably the most urgent problems "creating compli-
cated private relations and rights between the citizens of
these states" and requiring "the constant administration of
extra-municipal principles" are those arising under the re-
cent laws pertaining to jurisdiction of non-resident motorists.
No one can question the advisability and the expediency
of legislation which seeks to make amenable to the courts of
a state non-resident motorists who have caused serious injury
to persons and property by reason of the negligent operation
of an automobile on the public highways of that state. The
exercise of a state's police powers would alone justify such
laws. But how to acquire jurisdiction is a problem which
necessarily precedes all others. It is the purpose of this
article to review briefly the methods by which jurisdiction
may generally be acquired, and then to examine Section 52
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of New York State to note
whether or not the statute does constitute an encroachment
upon the independence of other states by a direct assertion
of authority over persons domiciled or property situated
elsewhere.
A sovereign has jurisdiction over property providing it
is situated within the boundaries of the state.4 It follows
' STORY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13.
'Garfein v. Mclnnis, 248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73 (1928).
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that a state may lawfully vest jurisdiction in its courts in
respect to controversies arising out of the ownership or title
to such property. If the statute makes provision for reason-
able notice to the resident or non-resident owner, the judg-
ment is conclusive and binding everywhere. Such notice,
although not a jurisdictional requisite, is necessary in order
that the proceeding be in accordance with due process of law.
Actions strictly in rem do not require personal service of the
summons on the defendant or his voluntary appearance to
give jurisdiction. The location of the property within the
state is the sole requirement. Upon this principle of public
law are founded state statutes providing that when the com-
plaint demands judgment that the defendant be excluded
from a vested or contingent interest in, or lien upon, specific
real or personal property within the state, the summons may
be served upon a defendant without the state.5
As a corollary to the above stated principle, it is also
generally recognized that provisional remedies which provide
for an attachment and levy of defendant's property within
the state prior to the commencement of the action may con-
fer jurisdiction upon the courts." Although the action in
these cases may be in personam, they are deemed in rem to
the extent of adjudicating the plaintiff's right to the attached
property. Manifestly, if the defendant has not conferred
jurisdiction by his appearance, the judgment cannot exceed
the value of the, attached property. The action is quasi in
rem and the court's jurisdiction, limited to the attached prop-
erty, is conclusive and final.7
In actions in personam, as for example, to recover dam-
ages for the commission of a tort, jurisdiction may be ac-
quired in one of three ways: to wit, by the presence of the
defendant within the state, by the allegiance of the defendant
to the state, or by the consent of the defendant.8
Among all nations it is recognized that a sovereign has
jurisdiction over all persons within its borders. It is imma-
terial that the non-resident's stay is temporary and with no
'N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 232, 235.
'PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEW YORK PLEADING AND PRACTICE
(1937) 912.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
'Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592 (1883).
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intent of establishing a residence. The authority vests by
reason of his presence alone. Huberus lays down the doc-
trine in his second maxim: "All persons who are found with-
in the limits of a government, whether their residence is per-
manent or temporary, are to be deemed subjects thereof."
Jurisdiction attaches when personal service of summons is
made upon the defendant. Where the defendant is a natural
person, such personal service requires a delivery of a copy of
the summons to the defendant within the state. A personal
delivery elsewhere will not suffice for the reason that juris-
diction is dependent solely on the defendant's presence within
the state. Indeed, the only equivalent for such personal ser-
vice is the general appearance of the defendant in the action.
Jurisdiction based upon personal service of process and
depending on the presence of the defendant within the state
is frequently recognized under the rules of private interna-
tional law in actions against foreign corporations. In the
development of the law it was at one time thought that juris-
diction over foreign corporations could only be acquired by
consent. The argument ran that a corporation had only one
domicile and that was in the state of its incorporation. It
could not migrate.9 But, since it was not protected by the
comity clause of the Federal Constitution, another state might
exclude it entirely from doing business within its borders
(providing interstate commerce was not affected thereby)
unless certain conditions were met. Thus, it was customary,
before granting authority, to exact from the foreign corpora-
tion its consent to confer jurisdiction in all actions brought
in the state court against it. The practice was frequently
criticized because in many instances it was apparent that the
consent could neither be objectively nor subjectively shown. 10
The doctrine that a corporation can be present only in the
state of its incorporation has been discarded. When it ap-
pears that a foreign corporation is engaged in another state
in a continuous course of business, systematically and regu-
larly carried on, the corporation is in fact there. Hence, ser-
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U. S. 1839) ; Lafayette Ins. Co.
v. French, 18 How. 404 (U. S. 1855).
30 Old Wayne Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct.
236 (1906); Bagdon v. Reading Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. 1075 (1916).
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vice upon one of its officers or agents is valid, jurisdiction at-
taches, and the judgment is conclusive and final."-
A sovereign has jurisdiction over its subjects although
the latter are temporarily absent from the state. Jurisdic-
tion by allegiance has been recognized under the principle of
the laws of nations and the common law from earliest times.
Under the Federal Constitution, all persons born or natural-
ized in the United States are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside. It follows that a state may
make provision for subjecting its residents to the jurisdiction
of its courts by substituted service of process. These methods,
clearly, would not be applicable in actions against non-
resident defendants. Judge Lehman, in his opinion in the
case of Rawstone v. Maguire,"2 pointed this out when he
wrote:
"Where there is no bodily presence in the state, where
there is no permanent place of abode and no domicile,
it is plain that there is no residence here and no basis
for the exercise of the jurisdiction of this court."
At common law, if a citizen failed to appear and answer
to the process of the courts of the land, he was outlawed and
his property was taken to satisfy the judgments of his credi-
tors. While outlawry does not exist here, it is nevertheless
true that jurisdiction may be acquired over resident defen-
dants without the necessity of personal service of process. In
the case of Continental lVational Bank v. Thurber,13 Judge
Follet definitely enunciated this rule in New York. In that
decision he said:
"A citizen of a state is bound by its laws, both sub-
stantive and those regulating judicial procedure. Ac-
quiring jurisdiction of resident defendants by con-
structive service of process is a proceeding according
'International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944(1913) ; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
"265 N. Y. 209, 192 N. E. 294 (1934).
"74 Hun 632, 26 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1st Dept. 1893), aff'd, 143 N. Y. 648,
37 N. E. 828 (1894).
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to the course of the common law, and is due process
of law."
Further on in his scholarly opinion, he wrote:
"Every sovereignty has power to regulate the proce-
dure of its courts, and prescribe the rights which plain-
tiffs may acquire, and the liabilities which may be
imposed on resident defendants by judgments recov-
ered in its tribunals."
Upon this principle of public law are founded state statutes
authorizing plaintiffs in actions in personamr to make appli-
cation to the court for orders permitting substituted service
.of process.14 Though the defendants may be natural or artifi-
cial persons, they must be shown to be residents of the state
for the reason that jurisdiction is acquired by allegiance.
If it is then established that personal service of the summons
cannot be made with due diligence, other prescribed methods
may be allowed.
The final method of acquiring jurisdiction over defen-
dants in actions in personam is by consent. It has always
been recognized that even a non-resident might validly con-
fer jurisdiction although he was not present or did not own
property within the state. The consent might be manifested
in different ways. If the defendant voluntarily participated
in the action, his consent would be implied.1 Frequently
statutes were enacted adopting this principle of public law
and providing that the service of a notice of appearance would
confer jurisdiction upon the court.'6 Finally, it was recog-
nized that a non-resident might validly appoint an agent
within the state upon whom personal service of summons
might be made, and the in personam judgment would be ac-
corded the same legal force and validity as if served on de-
fendant personally within the state.
It has previously been seen that foreign corporations
were frequently required, as a condition to their doing busi-
ness in a state, to obtain a certificate of authority. This,
'IN. Y. Civ. Pamc. Acv §§ 230, 231.
' Farmer v. N. L. Ass'n, 138 N. Y. 265, 33 N. E. 1075 (1893); Hen-
derson v. Henderson, 247 N. Y. 428, 160 N. E. 775 (1928).
. N. Y. Civ PRAc. Acr § 237.
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among other things, included the designation of the Secretary
of State as the organization's agent upon whom all process
in any action or proceeding against the corporation might
be served personally within the state. There was never any
serious doubt as to the constitutionality of these laws be-
cause the defendant could not invoke the protection of the
comity clause and, except as to interstate commerce, the state
might entirely exclude the defendant from carrying on busi-
ness within its borders.
With the increase of automobile travel and the dangers
to persons and property resulting from the negligent opera-
tion of automobiles on the public highways, a demand arose
for laws conferring jurisdiction upon state courts in actions
against non-resident motorists. Jurisdiction by presence was
not possible for the non-resident had returned to his home.
The very fact that the defendant was a non-resident precluded
the acquisition of jurisdiction by allegiance. Of course, there
was always the possibility of an attachment and levy, but
this, too often, proved worthless, for the defendant had no
property within the state which might be seized under the
attachment. The only possible solution was to secure juris-
diction by consent. New Jersey was the first state to enact
such a law when it required the non-resident motorist, upon
entering the state, to execute an express consent appointing
the Secretary of State as agent of the motorist upon whom
service might be made in actions arising out of defendant's
negligent operation of his automobile on the public high-
ways of the state.17 There was no reason why this particular
officer should be selected unless it was thought that having
worked successfully in the case of foreign corporations, there
must be something particularly sacrosanct about his office.
It would seem that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or
one of his many deputies would be a more appropriate per-
son to act as agent of drivers and owners of automobiles.
Massachusetts followed with a more workable rule.'8 The
statute provided that the use of its highways by non-resident
motorists constituted an implied appointment of the Regis-
1 N. J. P. L. (1906) 182, § 16 as amended by N. J. P. L. (1908) 615, §4.
MASS. GEN. LAWS, C. 90.
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trar of Motor Vehicles as the agent of the non-resident upon
whom personal service of summons might be made in actions
arising out of the negligent operation of defendant's automo-
bile. Both statutes made provisions for due notice to the de-
fendant of the personal service of process upon his appointed
agent. The statutes were before the United States Supreme
Court and were sustained in both instances.1 9 In these cases
the question of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant
was not directly before the court. The defendants had ap-
peared in the actions and contested the constitutionality of
the law as depriving them of life, liberty, and property with-
out due process in contravention of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In the opinion of the state court regarding the Mas-
sachusetts statute, it was pointed out: "No question has been
raised in the case at bar as to the sufficiency of the service
upon the defendant, if he can be held at all." 20 The court, in
both instances, held that the statutes did not deprive the de-
fendants of their privileges and immunities as citizens of the
United States under Article IV of the Federal Constitution
and that they did not constitute an unreasonable and arbi-
trary exercise of the state's police power in requiring non-
resident motorists, either expressly or impliedly, to appoint
agents upon whom personal service of process might be made;
and that, since due notice to the defendant was provided in
the statutes, it could not be said that the laws were not in
accordance with due process. As a result of these decisions,
it follows that a delivery of a copy of the summons within
the state to the designated agent is a delivery to the non-
resident; that due notice being given to the defendant, the
court in which the action is pending acquires jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant; and that the judgment rendered
is enforceable, not only in that state, but must also be recog-
nized as valid in every state of the Union.
New York's first statute on this subject was substan-
tially in the language of the Massachusetts law except that
it designated the Secretary of State as the agent of the non-
resident. The law was amended in 1937 and is now desig-
"Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
- Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760 (1924).
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nated as Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Our
examination will be directed particularly to the new section.2 '
The statute provides:
"The operation by a, non-resident of a motor vehicle or
motor cycle on a public highway in this state, or the
operation on a public highway in this state of a motor
vehicle or motor cycle owned by a non-resident if so
operated with his consent, express or implied, shall be
I N. Y. VEH. AND TRAF. LAW § 52, as amended by Laws of 1937, c. 94:
"Section 52. Service of Summons on Nonresidents. The operation by a non-
resident of a motor vehicle or motor cycle on a public highway in this state,
or the operation on a public highway in this state of a motor vehicle or motor
cycle owned by a nonresident if so operated with his consent, express or implied,
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the secre-
tary of state to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served the
summons in any action against him, growing out of any accident or collision in
which such nonresident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on
such a public highway or in which such motor vehicle or motor cycle may be
involved while being operated on such a highway with the consent, express or
implied, of such nonresident owner; and such operation shall be deemed a sig-
nification of his agreement that any such summons against him which is so
served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on him person-
ally within the state and within the territorial jurisdiction of the court from
which the summons issues. A summons in such an action may issue in any
court in the state having jurisdiction of the subject matter and be served as
hereinafter provided. Service of such summons shall be made by leaving with,
or mailing a copy thereof to the secretary of state at his office in the city of
Albany, or by personally delivering a copy thereof to one of his regularly
established offices, with a fee of two dollars, and such service shall be sufficient
service upon such nonresident provided that notice of such service and a copy
of the summons and complaint are forthwith sent by registered mail by the
plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant's return receipt, the plaintiff's affi-
davit of compliance herewith, and a copy of the summons and complaint shall
be filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, or with thejudge or justice of such court in case there be no clerk, within thirty days after
the defendant's return receipt is received by the plaintiff. Service of process
shall be complete ten days after the foregoing papers are filed. Service of such
summons also may be made by leaving with, or mailing a copy thereof to the
secretary of state at his office in the city of Albany, or by personally delivering
a copy thereof to one of his regularly established offices, with a fee of two
dollars, and by delivering a duplicate copy thereof, with the complaint annexed
thereto, to the defendant personally without the state by a resident or citizen
of the state of New York or a sheriff, under-sheriff, deputy-sheriff or constable
of the county or other political subdivision in which the personal service is made,
or an officer authorized by the laws of this state, to take acknowledgments of
deeds to be recorded in this state, or an attorney and/or counselpr at law quali-
fied to practice in the state where such service is made, or by a United States
marshal or deputy United States marshal. Proof of personal service without
the state shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending
within thirty days after such service. Personal service without the state is
complete ten days after proof thereof is filed. The court in which the action is
pending may order such extensions as may be necessary to afford the defendant
reasonable opportunity to defend the action."
[ VOL. 13
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deemed equivalent to an appointment by such non-
resident of the secretary of state to be his true and
lawful attorney upon whom may be served the sum-
mons in any action against him, growing out of any
accident or collision in which such non-resident may
be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such a
public highway or in which such motor vehicle or
motor cycle may be involved while being operated on
such a highway with the consent, express or implied,
of such non-resident owner; and such operation shall
be deemed a signification of his agreement that any
such summons against him which is so served shall be
of the same legal force and validity as if served on him
personally within the state and within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court from which the summons
issued * * * " (Italics ours.)
It will be noted that the implied consent of the non-
resident is limited by the statute to the appointment of the
Secretary of State. He alone is the lawful agent upon whom
such personal service may be made. According to the im-
plied consent, if the summons is served personally on him,
the service has the same force and validity as if served on
defendant personally within the state. In receiving and ac-
cepting service, the Secretary of State acts as agent of the
non-resident, and not as an officer of this state.
In the case of Flynn v. Union Surety and Guaranty Co., 2 2
the question arose as to the validity of service of summons
on the Superintendent of Insurance on a public holiday. The,
state officer had been previously designated by the non-
resident defendant as the agent for service of process within
the state. The court in sustaining the service said:
"It (the summons) was served upon him for the rea-
son that he was the appointed agent of the defendant,
representing it in this state for the purpose of receiv-
ing and admitting the service of process in actions or
special proceedings sought to be brought against it.
In receiving and accepting service he acted as agent
=170 N. Y. 145, 63 N. E. 61 (1902).
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of the defendant company, and not as an officer of the
state. While the statute required the defendant, be-
fore engaging in business in this state to execute and
deliver to him a power of attorney to receive the ser-
vice of process, his action under the power of attorney
was that of the company to whom he could be called
to account for any misconduct or omission with ref-
erence thereto."
If there is to be a valid service upon defendant's agent,
it is submitted that there must be a delivery of a copy of the
summons to the agent within the state. The language of the
statute admits of no substitute and, if it did, then it would
clearly be contrary to the established statutory practice of
this state. There is no civil action commenced by the per-
sonal service of summons which dispenses with a delivery of
a copy of the summons within the state. The practice is
mandatory-a brief review of the pertinent sections of the
Civil Practice Act demonstrates convincingly the great im-
portance placed by the legislature on the requirement that
there must be a personal delivery of a copy of the summons
within the state and that there can be no substitute.
Section 225 provides for service upon a natural person.
The very first sentence provides that the service of a sum-
mons must be made by a delivery of a copy thereof within
the state. If the defendant is an adult, the delivery within
the state is to him. If the defendant is an infant, the de-
livery within the state is to his father, mother or guardian,
and also to the infant if he is of the age of fourteen years or
over. If the defendant is an adjudicated incompetent, the
delivery within the state must be to his committee and the
incompetent, though in exceptional cases the court by order
may dispense with the latter service.
Section 228 provides for personal service of summons
upon a domestic corporation. In this instance, because the de-
fendant is an artificial person, the practice must make pro-
vision for service of the summons upon an agent of the de-
fendant. In this respect the practice is similar to the ser-
vice on the non-resident motorist. Again, the first sentence
of the section states: "Personal service of the summons upon
[ VOL. 13
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a domestic corporation must be made by delivering a copy
thereof, within the state." If the defendant is a city, deliv-
ery of a copy of the summons within the state must be made
to the mayor, comptroller or corporation counsel. If the de-
fendant is a county, town or village, delivery of a copy of the
summons within the state must be made to the designated offi-
cial. If the defendant is a private corporation, delivery of a
copy of the summons within the state must be made to the
designated persons associated with the defendant. Finally,
if the defendant is a business corporation, service, under cer-
tain circumstances, may be made on the Secretary of State,
but the practice further requires a delivery of a copy of the
summons to him within the state.23 Under our practice, from
colonial times, it has been recognized that personal service
can only be effected by a delivery within the state of a copy
of the summons to the defendants personally or to their au-
thorized agents. There is no substitute for this.
So again, under Section 229, provision is made for per-
sonal service of summons upon a foreign corporation. The
first sentence provides that personal service of summons
must be made by delivering a copy thereof within the state.
As under Section 228, the service being upon an agent of the
defendant, to this extent it resembles service upon the non-
resident motorist. In each instance it will be noted, whether
or not the agent is a high state official or the defendant's
managing clerk, the service of the summons must be by a
delivery of a copy thereof within the state to the agent.
Finally, under Section 227 of the Civil Practice Act the
situation is practically the same as under the Vehicle and
Traffic Law, except that the consent under the former is vol-
untary and limited to adult residents, while under the Vehi-
cle Law the consent is implied by reason of the non-resident's
use of the public highways. Both situations involve de-
fendants who are natural persons against whom personal
judgments may be obtained by reason of personal ser-
vice of summons upon their appointed agents. It will be
' N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 228. Sections 24 and 25 of the N. Y. Stock Cor-
poration Law providing for the appointment of the Secretary of State as agent
of domestic business corporations, require a delivery of copies of the summons
to the Secretary of State or one of his deputies.
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noted that under Section 227, after provision for the appoint-
ment of the agent is made, the statute provides that service
shall be made "in like manner and with like effect, as if it were
served personally upon the person making the designation."
Service made "in like manner" can mean only a delivery of
a copy of the summons to the agent -within the state, follow-
ing the requirements of Section 225. It would seem that the
language of Section 52 has been taken from Section 227 of
the Civil Practice Act for it, too, provides that the operation
of the motor vehicle is a signification of the non-resident's
agreement that any such summons against him which is so
served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if
served on him personally within the state. It definitely ap-
pears, therefore, that Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law and all the pertinent sections of the Civil Practice Act
relating to the practice in this state require that personal
service of summons can only be made by a delivery of a copy
of the summons within the state to the defendant or his ap-
pointed agent. (Italics ours.)
The principle that a remedial statute should be con-
strued liberally has no application when the objection is the
absence of jurisdiction. As was pointed out by Judge Chase
in the case of Erickson v. Macy: 24
"Whenever it is necessary to determine whether juris-
diction has been obtained over a defendant in an ac-
tion by service of the summons in some way other than
by personal service thereof, it must be remembered
that the general rule in regard to the service of process
established by centuries of precedent, is that process
must be served personally within the jurisdiction of
the court upon the person to be affected thereby. Sub-
stituted service when provided by statute is in deroga-
tion of such general rule, and, consequently, the direc-
tions thereof must be strictly construed and fully car-
ried out to confer any jurisdiction upon the court."
With bland disregard of the limits of the non-resident's
consent, forced upon him by the state, the statute proceeds
- 231 N. Y. 86, 90, 131 N. E. 744; 745 (1921).
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to specify the methods of service which are in no sense per-
sonal. It is true that infinite care is taken to give the defen-
dant due notice, but, unfortunately, these provisions do not
and cannot confer jurisdiction on the court to control per-
sons and things beyond the borders of the state. A delivery
of a summons and complaint on a defendant in New Jersey
will apprise him of the institution of an action, but no lawyer
would argue that it conferred jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.2r The statute continues as follows:
"Service of such summons shall be made by leaving
with or mailing a copy thereof to the secretary of state
at his office in the City of Albany or by personally de-
livering a copy thereof to one of his regularly estab-
lished offices, with a fee of two dollars * * *"
It would be difficult to find a more confusing statement.
Indeed, the Bar will have just reason to be disappointed with
the entire section. Lawyers in this state have been assured
that all future laws pertaining to practice will be definite,
concise and certain,--a sort of legal pasteurization through
which all proposed changes must pass. It would seem that
the statute authorizes three methods of serving the summons
upon the non-resident's agent: (1) leaving with the Secre-
tary of State a copy at his office in Albany; (2) mailing a
copy to the Secretary of State at his office in Albany; (3) per-
sonally delivering a copy at one of the regularly established
offices with a fee of two dollars.
If under the first method "leaving with" means a
delivery of a copy within the state to the Secretary
of State it is, at least, in accordance with the non-resident's
consent as provided for in the first sentence of the statute.
However, there is no reason for limiting the service to
Albany. Such a requirement hinders and delays the resi-
dent plaintiff and it is not a limitation contained in the
non-resident's consent. On the other hand, if "leaving with"
'Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928). The distinc-
tion was pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion. In the
case at bar, the objection is not lack of jurisdiction but denial of due process
because the non-resident statute did not require the secretary to notify the
non-resident defendant.
1939 ]
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does not require a personal delivery then the method is
invalid. We have seen under the practice of the state that
there is no substitute for personal delivery.
The second method provides for mailing a copy of the
summons to the Secretary of State at Albany. Apparently
it is not important whether or not sufficient postage is placed
on the letter. The grave objection, however, to this method
is that the non-resident has not consented that service may
be made by mail.
In the case of Bennett v. Supreme Tent K. of M., 26 in the
state of Washington Supreme Court, one of the issues con-
cerned the validity of the service of process, by mail, on a
statutory agent of defendant, a foreign corporation. The
court said:
"The agency created by the act in question, and by
the commissioner provided for therein, is a passive
agency. To hold that such agent can admit or waive
service of summons, when no service has been in fact
made, is to add materially to the powers conferred
upon him by the statute and by his warrant of attor-
ney. The insurance laws of New York are similar to
our own on the question under consideration. In the
case of Farmer v. National Life Ass'n, 50 Fed. 829, the
superintendent of insurance, who was the statutory
agent in that state, formally admitted service of a
summons and complaint, which he had received
through the mail, as in this case.2 7  The court held,
40 Wash. 431, 82 Pac. 744 (1905).
We quote from 2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 390n.: "In Farmer v. National Life
Ass'n, 50 Fed. 829, cited in Bennett v. Supreme Tent, K. of M., it was held that
the state superintendent of insurance, who, it is stated in the statement of facts,
had been designated by the insurance company as its attorney in the exact
language of the statute, could not accept service by mail; but, the action being
subsequently remanded to the state court, it was held that the service was valid
and sufficient, though it does not clearly appear whether the court meant to
decide that service by mail in such cases is valid, or that the superintendent of
insurance had power to admit due service.
"In South Pub. Co. v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 67 Hun 119, 21 N. Y.
Supp. 1056, 67 Hun 41, 21 N. Y. Supp. 675, it was held that personal service on
a clerk in the office of the superintendent of insurance, which service was subse-
quently admitted by the superintendent, was valid. In this case, also, it does not
clearly appear whether the validity of a service on the clerk, or the power of
the superintendent to admit the service, was the basis of the decision; and, even
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without an opinion, that such service was void. The
syllabus of the case is as follows: 'The appointment
of the state superintendent of insurance as the attor-
ney of a non-resident insurance company for the pur-
pose of receiving service of process, as required by New
York Laws, 1884, Chap. 346, sec. 1, p. 420, does not
authorize him to accept service by mail and such ser-
vice is void.'"
The third method providing for a personal delivery to a
regularly established office is a novel one. It is entirely un-
important to whom this delivery shall be made. The only re-
quirement is that someone can there be found who will ac-
cept the fee of two dollars to complete the service. This
should not be difficult but unfortunately the method is not
provided for in the non-resident's consent.
Section 52 makes no further provision for service upon
the non-resident's agent. What follows might be sufficient in
itself to give due notice to the defendant, but it could not add
to the jurisdiction of the court. The statute continues:
"And such service shall be sufficient service upon such
non-resident provided that notice of such service and
a copy of the summons and complaint are forthwith
sent by registered mail by the plaintiff to the defen-
dant."
This section requires that the complaint be annexed to
the summon thus placing the non-resident defendant in a
quandary. If he is to be guided by the direction contained in
the summons and served upon his agent, he will only be re-
quired to serve his notice of appearance within twenty days
after service upon him is complete.2 8  On the other hand, if
he is to be guided by the papers he receives, he will be re-
quired to serve his answer within twenty days after the ser-
vice upon him is complete. Since the court's jurisdiction
if the latter was the true ground, the decision is of no general value, because,
by the terms of the power of attorney, the superintendent was authorized both
to receive and accept service of process."
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. RULE 45.
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depends upon the service of the process within this date, it
would seem that a notice of appearance within twenty days
should suffice. The doubt, however, will remain until cor-
rected or judicially construed.
The statute continues with an alternative provision in
respect to the notice to be given to the non-resident. The
service upon the agent within the state is identical to that
which is provided above. The notice to be given to the non-
resident defendant is provided for as follows:
"* * * By delivering a duplicate copy thereof, with
the complaint annexed thereto, to the defendant per-
sonally without the state by a resident or citizen of
the state of New York or a sheriff, undersheriff or
constable of the county or other political subdivision
in which the personal service is made, or an officer au-
thorized by the laws of this state, to take acknowledg-
ments of deeds to be recorded in this state, or an at-
torney and/or counselor at law qualified to practice
in the state where such service is made, or by a United
States Marshal or deputy United States Mar-
shal."
If the service is to be made personally without the state,
by a resident or a citizen, is it valid if made by an infant?
Personal service in this state requires that the process server
shall be of the age of eighteen, or upward; there is no express
limitation found here. 29 Secondly, in connection with the
service of the summons and complaint, is it required that
some notice of the service of the summons upon the defen-
dant's agent within the state shall be given? It would seem
that this was the most important document that the non-
resident should receive. He is then apprised that the court
has acquired jurisdiction over his person by reason of the due
service within this state upon an individual who has acted
as his agent. Without any notice being given, the non-
resident is only apprised of the institution of an action in
which, apparently, our courts have never secured jurisdic-
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 220.
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tion. That it was the intention not to require service of such
notice seems to follow from what the statute provides:
"Proof of personal service without the state shall be
filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is
pending, within thirty days after such service. Per-
sonal service without the state is complete ten days
after proof thereof is filed."
It will be noted that no provision is made for a filing of
the proof of service upon the agent within the state. , Under
such circumstances, in the event that the defendant default-
ed, the judgment roll would never show such service, and the
in personam judgment would clearly, on its face, be abso-
lutely void. 0
It would seem that Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law constitutes an attempt on the part of this state to pro-
ject its laws and judgments into sister states, and control
persons and things in the sister states without acquiring
jurisdiction according to the fundamental principles of pub-
lic law. Lip service to these principles is given, it is true,
but the practice provided is in flagrant disregard of all of
them. The results inevitably will work a hardship on the
residents of New York. They will rely on the law, only to
find sister states refusing to recognize the judgments obtained
thereunder. The claims will then probably be outlawed by
Statutes of Limitations, so that an action in the state of de-
fendant's residence will not lie. The number of causes of ac-
tions arising in this state every year and requiring such ser-
vice of summons on non-resident defendants is enormous. To
protect the residents of this state and to insure the validity
of the judgments, the statute should be amended immediately.
WILLIAM TAPLEY.
St. John's University School of Law.
SWuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 18, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928), held a
statute of New Jersey void for this reason. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the
majority, said: "The question made in the present case is whether a statute mak-
ing the Secretary of State the person to receive the process, must, in order to
be valid, contain a provision making reasonably probable that notice of the
service on the secretary will be communicated to the non-resident defendant
who is sued."
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